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Abstract: Contemporaneous global demographic, environmental, and economic  trends have 
elevated water issues to the fore of human rights and national security debates. Ipso facto, a 
profusion of research has attempted to explicate water insecurity causes and effects. This article 
examines the foremost theoretical explanations, data, and discrepancies. It then proposes and 
quantitatively tests a more parsimonious and evidentially coherent state bureaucratic capacity 
theory of water security. The results support the proposed theory and reveal three significant 
conclusions. Times series analyses reveal mixed-type regimes produce reduced water security 
compared to autocracies and democracies, with closed anocracies performing worst; this finding 
persists when controlling economic development, political violence, and endemic natural 
freshwater resources. Higher state bureaucratic capacity produces greater water security. Lastly, 
improvements in bureaucratic capacity most positively affect civilian access to potable water in 
anocratic regimes. These findings suggest a reassessment of development and humanitarian aid 
efforts and redirection towards government administrative capacity building.  
 
Keywords: State Bureaucratic Capacity, Regime, Water Security  
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Villagers in Viralimalai taluk, India, plastic pots in hand, can be seen trekking miles to 
fetch water (Tiruchirapalli, 2017). In Cape Town, South Africa, residents face a looming water 
scarcity crisis with dam water levels at only 12.3% of normal (Andersen, 2017). In Bolivia, Peru, 
and Ecuador water scarcity and access issues have generated protests, strikes, confrontational 
deaths, and even declarations of martial law in some Peruvian provinces (Vidal, 2017). Another 
news update: “Flint water crisis likely the cause of deadly Legionnaires outbreak” (Ganim, 
2017). These headlines highlight water issue pervasiveness and import as an increasing security 
concern in both academic and policy debates. 
The statistics are staggering. Five thousand children die daily due to preventable water 
and sanitation related diseases (United Nations Regional Information Center for Western 
Europe). 80% of the world’s population is exposed to high levels of threat to water security 
(Vörösmarty et al., 2010). And four billion people face severe water scarcity (Mekonnen & 
Hoekstra, 2016). Access to drinking water has gender dimensions; wherein women and girls 
carry the primary responsibility of collecting water in households with access, which creates 
significant burden and result in girls missing school (UNICEF, 2011; Bagri, 2017, Frej, 2017). 
Since 1990, over 800 million people have gained access to safe drinking water, according to the 
United Nations; however, an estimated 884 million people globally do not have such privileges.  
Clearly, the consequences of water scarcity, quality, and inequitable allocation, are 
profound; Water’s ubiquity cannot be overstated; Water is essential for drinking, agriculture, 
livestock, electricity generation and many industrial processes. Dehydration can even lead to 
cognitive impairments, and even long term detriments when chronic (Grandjean & Grandjean, 
2007; Wilson & Morley, 2003). Water is essential to cooking, cleaning, bathing, and gardening. 
Poor sanitation can, and frequently does, lead to waterborne diseases outbreaks (e.g., cholera, 
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salmonella, shigella, lead contamination) with concomitant economic production consequences. 
Gender and geographical location further intersect with water contamination and access (Sultana, 
2007). Acute droughts periodically put millions of lives and livelihoods at risk.  
Its centrality at the nexus of industrial development, agriculture, energy, environment, 
and human health makes achieving water security complicated. Both causes of water (in)security 
and subsequent effects are multidirectional and multifarious in nature. Understanding the central 
determinants of water security is vital to address global water issues, which are predicted to rise 
in importance as population increases, climate change deepens, and pollution endures, and 
natural freshwater resources are depleted. Governments already play key roles in public health, 
energy production, and traditional public goods. Contemporary water issues have produced 
growing government mediation. The impact governments have on water security and the 
underlying mechanisms that produce disparities in water security outcomes between states is still 
in contention. This study aims to advance water security literature by proposing and testing a 
novel bureaucratic capacity theory of water security. 
 
Literature Review 
 The following literature review will define water security, provide a brief overview on 
existing literature on the sources of water security, introduce bureaucratic capacity as a potential 
determinant, and overview the existing literature on bureaucratic capacity. 
Defining Water Security 
Water security as a concept has received greater consideration over the twenty years, in 
both policy and academic debates.  
 No single, universal definition of “water security,” exists. Multiple definitions of this 
concept exist; researchers in various fields define water security in ways that often emphasize 
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their area of interest (human rights, energy, agriculture, economic development, cleanliness, 
etc.), while international organizations tend to embrace broad, integrative definitions. The World 
Economic Forum elegantly defines the intersectional nature of water security in its definition, 
describing it as “the gossamer that links together the web of food, energy, climate, economic 
growth and human security challenges that the world economy faces over the next two decades” 
(World Economic Forum Water Initiative, 2012). The United Nations relatedly delineates it “as 
the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable 
quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and socio-economic development, 
for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for 
preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability” (UN-Water, 2013). Grey and 
colleagues (2013) eschew comprehensiveness for a reductionist conceptualization, defining 
water security as “a tolerable level of water-related risk to society.” WaterAid, an international 
organization aimed at improving access to clean water for marginalized populations worldwide, 
more narrowly defines water security as the “reliable access to water of sufficient quantity and 
quality for basic human needs, small-scale livelihoods and local ecosystem services, coupled 
with a well-managed risk of water-related disasters” (WaterAid, 2012). Its multidimensional 
nature engenders ongoing contention over water security theoretical bases. 
Any research paper assessing the relationship between water security’s and any 
phenomenon, given water’s intersectional nature and ubiquitous essentiality, must avoid 
tautology in its definition. This proves a complex matter if one bravely attempts operationalizing 
the UN Water (2013) or World Economic Forum (2012) water security definitions. 
Paradoxically, the completeness by which they define state water security renders assessment of 
factors affecting water security incredibly difficult. Operationalization must also avoid control 
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and explanatory variable overlap with water security variable, antithetical variable 
operationalizations, and pleonasms that render drawing real conclusions overly complicated 
given variable phenomenological relatedness (Cook & Bakker, 2012). Therefore, this paper will 
focus, as WaterAid (2012) and in the 2000 UN Millennium Development Goals have in their 
operationalizations, upon the human security element of water security – that being the percent 
of a population with access to an improved water source. An improved water source is one where  
“human use is kept separate from use by animals and fecal contamination” (WWAP, 2015).  
 World Water Assessment Programme’s anthropocentric operationalization implicitly 
factors water infrastructural investment, distribution, access, and resource allocation. Thus, this 
parsimonious definition allows one to assess the interacting effects of climate change, conflict, 
natural freshwater resources, civilian liberties, economic development, and state bureaucratic 
capacity on water security, temporally and spatially, without the confounding consequences of a 
multifactorial definition.   
Determinants of State Water Security: 
 Multi-sectoral importance has produced a gluttony of research ascertaining and defending 
innumerable causal variables influencing water security. Exhaustive evaluation of each factor’s 
temporal, spatial, and multidirectional causal values would require a novel. However, several 
major broad affectors have been defended most rigorously, which can be split into two camps: 
environmental and human determinants of water security. 
 Environmental Determinants of water security include geography (Yoffe et al. 2004; 
Link, Scheffran, & Ide, 2016; MacDonald et al., 2011), climate change, existing natural 
freshwater resources (Grey & Sadoff, 2007), and global hydrogeological processes (de Suarez et 
al., 2014; Feger & Hawtree, 2013). Climate change exists as a complex connection wherein long-
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term human causes are producing ongoing climate warming and shifts. The results of climate 
change are environmental phenomena and on a larger time scale than daily or annual 
anthropocentric water security, and not resolvable over a brief period by any singular state. Thus, 
climate change has been placed within the environmental determinants of water security category 
(Turral, Burke, & Faurès, 2011; Link, Scheffran, & Ide, 2016; Schindler, 2001). 
 The defended human determinants encompass a complex array of social, economic, 
political, and population factors. Human demographics and human geography, including 
population growth (Vörösmarty et al., 2000), urbanization, and population distribution (Sadik, 
1991; Thompson et al. 2001), have been shown to affect water security. Logistically, Siting, 
design and construction of water sources (often called “water infrastructure”) affects access as 
well. Economically, sectoral allocation of water resources (US Department of Energy, 2006; 
Delucci, 2010; Rosegrant & Ringler, 2000), economic development (Palmer, 2010), 
infrastructure more broadly (Grey & Sadoff, 2007; Thompson et al., 2001), and poverty and 
wealth inequality have in turn been defended as demonstrable influencers of water security 
(Hussain & Hanjra, 2004; MacDonald et al., 2011). Socio-politically, political will and 
community resilience to cope with water supply stresses (Turral, Burke, & Faurès, 2011; 
Langridge, Christian-Smith, & Lohse, 2006), management of water resources and supply 
services (Vörösmarty et al., 2010; Vörösmarty et al., 2005; Ahmad, 2003), domestic conflict, and 
interstate conflict all affect water security (Yoffe et al., 2004; Link, Scheffran, & Ide, 2016). 
There is even evidence that water security may factor into the political stability of a state 
(Gleick, 1993). 
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 With the vast array of determinants, four factors have received the most import in water 
security research: intrastate and interstate violent conflict, economic development, civilian 
liberties, and climate change.  
As awareness and understanding of climate change have improved, research has 
flourished contending the various consequences it will have and already is exerting. It has been 
argued climate change is quickly becoming one of the major determinants of water security 
(Turral, Burke, & Faurès, 2011; Link, Scheffran, & Ide, 2016). Climate change effects on water 
level, weather patterns and their severity, ground water, and agricultural production are all 
predicted to create negative consequences, particularly upon the impoverished, as the world 
adapts and faces human-induced global climate shifts and warming (Turral, Burke, & Faurès, 
2011; Link, Scheffran, & Ide, 2016; Grey & Sadoff, 2007; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012). 
Conflict over water access and security have already happened. What’s more, climate-
related conflict over water security has been discussed at the UN Security Council as potential 
risks to international security (Detraz & Betsill, 2009). Water’s centrality paired with 
developmental pressures, domestic demands, reduced water availability, pollution, and 
environmental degradation increases the likelihood that hydropolitics lead to military clashes 
(Bogardi et al., 2012; Dinar, 2002; Toset, Gleditsch, & Hegre, 2000; Bernauer & Siegried, 2012). 
The Malthusian argument posits that interstate violent conflict can arise over transboundary 
water disputes and as states try to compensate growing domestic demands with dwindling supply 
(Renveney and Maxwell, 2001). Domestically, water scarcity and inequitable access can produce 
political instability and violent confrontations (Homer-Dixon, 1994). In simple terms, conflict 
theory of water security posits that conflict reduces water security via the destruction of water-
related infrastructure and disruption of governance. 
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The economic theory of water security maintains that countries with low economic 
development have higher water insecurity as they have lower capacities to build adequate water 
infrastructure, develop technological innovations to solve water resource issues, and fewer 
civilians can afford water (Jia, Zhang, Yang, & Xia, 2004; Liu, Yang, & Savenije, 2008; Hussain 
& Hanjra, 2004; Allan, 1996; Flörke et al., 2013; Zeitoun, 2011). Indeed, progress has been 
slowest in least developed countries, while middle income countries have more than halved the 
proportion of the population without access to an improved water source since 1990 (WHO 
Drinking Water Report, 2011). While economic development is clearly established as a water 
security influencer, its weight may be overstated. Water insecurity isn’t restricted to 
underdeveloped countries, many OECD nations face pressing water issues. Drought and 
allocation issues in California and protests over water pollution in Flint, Michigan persist, while 
middle-income and water-scarce Turkey, hosting millions of refugees, has ensured otherwise 
surprisingly high water quality and access (World Resources Institute, 2015).   
Most convincingly, researchers argue that civilian liberties improve access to water and 
overall state water security (Edwards, 2012; Tempelhoff, 2009; Holden & Jacobson, 2008; 
Hanna, 2005). The civil liberties argument is most convincingly defended by Jeffrey Edwards 
(2012). He and others assert that democracies, vis-à-vis civil liberties, enhance civilian voices 
and government accountability as civilians may make demands without fear of reprisals and with 
knowledge that they hold the power to re-elect a politician or elect one more receptive to their 
plight. Furthermore, in countries with robust civil liberties people are more secure that others 
will not ransack their water supplies and if an issue arises, they can inform the state and pursue 
courts for just compensation. In sum, freer, more democratic states, it is argued, have citizens 
that are better placed to pressure a state into ensuring equitable and consistent access to water. It 
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must be noted, the civil liberties argument rests upon the assumption that it is ultimately the state 
bureaucracy that determines water security, with civil liberties mediating its influence. Simply, 
the civil liberties theory of water security contends that civil liberties positively affects 
bureaucratic capacity which in turn ensures higher human water security. This civil liberties 
argument would those postulate that higher civil liberties rankings would correlate with higher 
bureaucratic capacity and consequently, water security. Thus, authoritarian regimes should be the 
least water secure and full participatory democracies the most water secure, with mixed-type 
regimes in-between.  
Bureaucratic Capacity 
 Bureaucracy and “bureaucrats” have gained a more negative connotation in contemporary 
usage, yet evidence affirms its enduring importance in the management of resources (Aucoin, 
1997). Political science employs bureaucratic capacity and related terms at times equivalently, at 
times meticulously differentiated, and not rarely as vacuous gobbledygook. Hendrix (2010) 
defines state capacity as encompassing both the state’s military capacity and the state’s civil 
society capacity, called bureaucratic capacity. Others use institutional capacity as synonymous 
with bureaucratic capacity, while some use it to differentiate from state administrative capacity 
(bureaucratic capacity) and overall national administrative capacity (capacity of NGOs, private 
companies, and bureaucratic capacity). Others use state capacity, bureaucratic capacity, and 
institutional capacity nearly synonymously. I will be using these terms interchangeably for the 
sake of variation and focus upon state bureaucratic capacity solely.  
Bureaucratic capacity, like water security, is a multifaceted concept. Weber (1978) 
emphasized the importance of autonomous and professional bureaucracies in his framework, he 
suggested that it allows the state to manage complex matters, ensures efficiency in delegation 
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and implementation, stems corruption, and legitimizes the state’s authority. Hendrix (2010) 
suggests that this capacity may be the state’s professionalization of the state bureaucracy, its 
ability to monitor the population and its needs, its organization, its quality, its incentives and 
revenue generating capacity (Karl, 1997; Chaudhry, 1989), and its ability to efficiently manage, 
adapt, and respond to various situations and crises (such as drought, flood, oil spill, energy 
demands, etc.). Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009) created a country-level world 
governance index (WGI) that aggregates six governance dimensions: political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, voice and accountability, control of corruption, 
regulatory quality, and rule of law. While comprehensive, again this faces issues in 
operationalization. Testing relative variable impacts would thus lead to circular reasoning if one 
attempts to employ violent conflict or civil liberties, and decrease overall conceptual clarity 
(Fukuyama, 2013). Several researchers define state capacity as “the ability of state institutions to 
effectively implement official goals,” thereby “avoiding normative conceptions about what a 
state ought to do or how it ought to do it” (Skkink, 1991; Hanson & Sigman, 2013). Kaufmann’s 
government effectiveness measure may best satisfy these competing definitions while 
maintaining conceptual clarity.  
As a limited commodity with some public good characteristics global variability in 
freshwater distribution, regime type, levels of economic development, and conflict, one must 
wonder what independent role bureaucratic institutions, if any, in ensuring water security.  
Bureaucratic Capacity Theory of Water Security 
Water has been conceptualized and constitutionalized (e.g., South Africa, Canada) as a 
human right, with access expressly protected. Democratic regimes are systems of government 
whereby all eligible members of a state select representatives of the state through transparent, 
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multi-party elections, thereby constituting majority rule. This system, in theory, provides a 
means of accountability of leadership to the people. Accountability, in this context is politician 
re-election and leadership electability. Thus, if the public is dissatisfied with water security, the 
populace may vote the leaders out of office, thereby providing an incentive to provide stronger 
public services, such as water sanitation and access, in democracies than autocracies.   
However, mixed institutions, frequently called hybrid regimes or anocracies, are likely to 
have recently undergone societal upheaval, such as war, and are likely in a transitional 
governmental phase (Hegre, 2001). More likely to experience civil war, anocracies have even 
greater risk during transitions towards democracy and as the magnitude of that transition 
increases (Regan & Bell, 2010). As outlined above, war disrupts institutions and destroys 
infrastructure, both key components in water security. Given the likely proximity to conflict and 
political transitional nature in anocracies, those states are likely to exhibit reduced bureaucratic 
capacity. Despite increased government accountability and civilian liberties in anocratic regimes, 
its reduced bureaucratic capacity relative to strict authoritarian regimes is expected within the 
bureaucratic capacity theoretical framework to consequently produce reduced water security. 
Political stability and regime change are two ways that bureaucratic capacity may be 
dampened. Anocracies themselves may inherently exhibit qualities that would reduce their 
bureaucratic capacity, due to incongruities in their mixed authoritarian-democratic nature. 
Research supports this supposition; Gurr (1974) found that mixed-type regimes exhibit lower 
durability (persistence and adaptability) than either highly autocratic or highly democratic states. 
Gurr concludes that his findings are consistent with Eckstein’s “congruence-consonance” theory 
of political performance, which postulates “political institutions perform and endure best if (a) 
their authority patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of adjacent social institutions, 
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and (b) their authority patterns are internally consonant” (Eckstein, 1968 read in Gurr 1974). 
Bäck and Hadenius (2008) have argued that both stable democracies and stable autocracies are 
likely to foster high levels of state capacity; they found a J-curve relationship between regime 
type and state capacity. They contended that in consolidated democracies, state bureaucratic 
capacity is likely high due to both bottom-up control through a vibrant civil society and political 
competition, and by top-down control through a well-institutionalized administration. While state 
bureaucratic state capacity in consolidated autocracies is likely to reach a moderately high level 
because it is facilitated by top-down control. It is relatedly postulated that state capacity in 
mixed-type regimes is likely to be low as they maintain less bottom-up and top-down control. 
Anocracies posit a wrench in the civilian liberties theory of water security. 
Nations face multiple threats to their water security; relationships between various threats 
are complex and intertwined. Threats from climate change, pollution, soil runoff, overuse, and 
environmental destruction cannot be considered in isolation and require a higher authority, the 
state, to address water threats. Water security’s complexity and ubiquity throughout every 
economic sector creates issues in private or local level community civil organization 
management. Insuring water security requires monitoring environmental conditions and water 
tables, disaster mitigation planning, regulating amount of usage by competing entities, sanitation, 
water infrastructure development and implementation, resolving transboundary issues, 
sustainability assessment, providing clean water to civilians, and generating financial means to 
consistently manage each. items of legislation and fiscal measures that influence water 
management, service delivery and level of demand. Moreover, government decisions outside the 
water domain (i.e., decisions concerning energy prices, agricultural subsidies, trade agreements, 
and poverty reduction strategies, often have major impacts on water. Balancing both competing 
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water demands, intertwined threats, and considering external policy impacts requires strong 
national-level administrative capacity. 
 Water privatization, however, produces narrow business efficiency and profit-motive 
incentives that can lead to unequal distribution and access, making the above more difficult. Case 
in point: Bolivia witnessed violent clashes in 2000 after civilians experienced the repercussions 
of water privatization (Cochabamba, 2000). Neoliberalist privatization may suffice for traditional 
public goods, such as electricity or garbage disposal, but face greater challenges when applied to 
water. In Chile, strong state role in water management has been key to fulfilling civilian water 
rights, in an otherwise privatized water sector (Baer, 2014).   
Decentralization reduces ability to adequately monitor, regulate, mobilize and implement 
changes as it confers lower human capital and less legitimate authority at the national level. 
Decentralized democracies, like Spain, and decentralized autocracies, like Qaddafi-era Libya, 
exist. Decentralization may confer high bureaucratic capacity at lower local level governance, 
the concomitant reduced administrative abilities and authority make ensuring national water 
security difficult. With natural water resources, industry, agriculture, people inequitably 
distributed throughout any given country, lower national level bureaucratic capacity would 
produce difficulties in regulating, balancing competing water demands, and addressing specific 
water issues.  
If bureaucrats not professional or faces high turnover, the government will inherently face 
greater obstacles in its administrative duties. If the bureaucracy is conversely dominated by any 
interest group or economic sector resolving water distribution and usage issues, as competing 
demands may not be able to be resolved. Low bureaucratic capacity reduces politician incentive 
to undertake reforms necessary for successful policy making (Huber & McCarty, 2004). 
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As the world is seeing now in developed democratic nations, water challenges and demands 
can vary greatly by region. Some nations have adequately addressed this concerns while other 
democracies vary considerably. Decentralization, privatization, and high bureaucrat turnover can 
hinder administrative capacity even in democratic states. Civil liberties do not alone ensure state 
capacity to legislate, organize, monitor, implement, regulate and may fail to explain anocratic 
water insecurity. Civil liberties’ mediational effect on bureaucratic capacity does not 
satisfactorily explain between and within regime variation in policy implementation ability or 
water security. State bureaucratic capacity may therefore have additional effects on water 
security independent of civilian liberty mediation. I theorize higher state bureaucratic capacity 
produces greater water security.  
 
Hypotheses 
H1: Democratic regimes are the most water secure. 
H2: Anocracies are the least water-secure regimes. 
H3: Higher state bureaucratic capacity improves water security. 
H4: States with the lowest bureaucratic capacity will be the least water secure. 
H5: Anocracies have the lowest bureaucratic capacity. 
H6: Improvements in bureaucratic capacity will most positively impact water security in 
anocratic regimes. 
 The following paper tests these five hypotheses. I will explain my research design; 
highlight key findings; conclude with a discussion of the research strengths, limitations, and 
possible implications. 
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Research Design 
 The above hypotheses are tested through using several datasets that assess regime type, 
water security, natural water resources, economic prosperity, and state bureaucratic capacity. It is 
intended to assess the effect of regime type on water security. To do so accurately, three control 
variables are employed to reduce likelihood of any lurking causal mechanisms. The integral 
nature of water to life serves the question whether the direction of causality may be reversed. 
Indeed, there is evidence that water security may factor into the political stability of a state 
(Gleick, 1993). However, regime and bureaucratic capacity change occur due to a wide 
confluence of factors, thereby greatly diminishing the direct effect of water security. 
Furthermore, analyses were conducted to further resolve questions of reverse causality. The 
resulting dataset includes over 120 states in which there was accurate data on the explanatory 
(regime type, bureaucratic capacity), response (water security), and control (MEPV, endemic 
water resources, GNI/capita PPP) variables over the period 1996-2014. Time series analyses 
were limited to the period 1996-2014 due to available data in each of the variables. There has 
been robust international scholarly consensus that the post-Cold War era is uniquely 
characterized. Thus, limited to this interval can eliminate any major confounding shifts in global 
affairs and geopolitics as well as historical data that may be less accurately collected. 
Water Security 
 Empirical analyses of water security generally range from access to clean water, local 
natural water availability, quality of sanitation services, and distribution of water resources. The 
Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies affirms, “Water security is essential for 
human access for health, wellbeing, economic and political stability. It is essential to limit risks 
of water- related hazards. A complete and fair valuation of the resource, sustainability of 
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ecosystems at all parts of the hydrologic cycle and an equitable and cooperative sharing of water 
resources is very necessary” (Water Aid, 2009) Indeed, water security not only involves access 
but equity, affordability, regulation, and distribution amongst competing household, agricultural, 
and industrial demands. This study uses World Bank data on the percent of a population with 
access to an improved water source its measure of water security, for it implicitly assesses 
investment in water infrastructure as well as distribution and allocation of resources ( 
Natural Water Resources 
 Any attempt to assess water security must be careful that natural climatic and freshwater 
resources are not confounding any results. Thus, World Development data on renewable internal 
freshwater resources per capita in cubic meters was utilized as a control variable. This measure 
includes internal river flow, groundwater, and rainfall estimates and thus serves as a robust 
control. 
Economic Prosperity 
 Wealthier states have greater funds available to build water infrastructure. A control was 
used to eliminate any possible confounding relationship between regime type and economic 
prosperity affect upon water security. Various measures of economic security exist – from life 
expectancy to transportation infrastructure. This study used World Bank data on Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP), converted to international 
dollars.  
Conflict 
 As mentioned previously, there is evidence of relationships between mixed regimes and 
conflict. As conflict destroys infrastructure and delivery institutions, a third control variable was 
used to ensure any relationship between water security and regime type is not simply the 
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relationship between devastating conflicts and clean water accessibility. Conflict was assessed 
using major episodes of political violence time-series data from the Center for Systematic Peace 
Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) armed conflict and intervention data 
subset. A measure of major episodes of political violence (MEPV) was used as it assesses a wide 
range of state conflict types and addresses issues of political stability in its measure. The 
individual measure used, ACTOTAL, is a total summed magnitude of all societal and interstate 
MEPV, including civil warfare/violence, ethnic violence, and interstate and international 
violence/warfare. Given the powerful effect of conflict on population health and economies, it is 
the aim of this variable to eliminate this interacting variable to ensure it is the characteristic of 
the regimes affecting water security in data analyses, rather than an interaction of political 
upheaval. 
Regime Type 
Regime type represents a comprehensive state-level aggregate of civil liberties and 
provides a more solid foundation for theory testing than individual civil liberties measures alone 
can provide. Regime type is assessed using the reputable Polity IV dataset. The Polity2 variable 
was used, as it is a revised combined polity score modified to allow for more accurate 
assessment of time-series data. States are coded on a -10 to +10 integer scale, creating an 
autocracy-to-democracy gradient score, respectively. Most studies operationalize anocratic 
regimes using POLITY scores, with the cutoff range typically -5 to +5 on the POLITY scale 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Marshall and Gurr 2003). This range of scores on the POLITY index 
represents countries that are characterized by some democratic institutional elements and some 
autocratic characteristics. This numerical and conceptual range is much greater than that of 
democracies or autocracies. It is thus split up into two subcategories, open and closed anocracies, 
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as frequently done in Polity data sets, to better visualize relationships. Final regime types were 
partitioned such that autocracies = -10 to -6, closed anocracies = -5 to 0, open anocracies = 1 to 
5, and democracies = 6 to 10.  
Bureaucratic Capacity 
Bureaucratic capacity will be measured using a subset of the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators dataset, which includes aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 
countries and territories over the period 1996–2015, for six dimensions of governance. The 
Government Effectiveness estimate will be employed as the operational measure of bureaucratic 
capacity. The measure, “captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard 
normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5” (Kaufmann, Kraay & 
Mastruzzi, 2009).  
Statistical Analyses 
 Relevant data were collected and translated into an accessible Microsoft Excel document, 
with missing variables eliminated from analyses, coded missing. The data was then imported into 
Stata software for statistical analyses. Relationships between regime type, bureaucratic capacity, 
and water security were assessed independently of control variables. Then, a more complicated 
model was assessed in which the interaction between regime type and water security was 
assessed while accounting for the three control variables. Multiple variable regression analyses 
were performed, and marginal effects of predictor variables on water security assessed. 
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Results 
 Simple frequency tables revealed that data analysis could be proceeded, given the 
robustness of data and variability in GNI/capita PPP, access to improved water sources, total 
incidences of major political violence, and in renewable internal freshwater resources. Despite a 
plurality of nations categorized of states categorized as democracy utilizing the Polity regime-
typing methodology, there were significant numbers of each of the four regime types. Thus, it 
was deemed appropriate to proceed with further analysis. 
Multiple preliminary analyses were then conducted to identify possible interacting 
variables, thereby narrowing the proper interaction and multiple variable regression analyses to 
assess whether regime type effects water security. 
Conflict and Regime Type 
 A simple OLS regression analysis found major episodes of political violence (MEPV) 
correlated with regime type (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Bar graph of mean MEPV by regime type. Regression analysis was statistically 
significant (p<0.000), whereby more democratic states were significantly less likely to have a 
MEPV over the entire 1990-2014 interval. 
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Development and Regime Type 
 Interestingly, as seen in Figure 2, autocracies and democracies reported similar aggregate 
average GNI/capita in purchasing power parity (international $), and that was significantly 
greater than either mixed regime (closed or open anocracies). Democracies did not statistically 
differ from autocracies (p=.526), while anocracies and democracies report significantly higher 
(p=0.000) average GNI/cap. In the analysis, anocracies are coded 1, closed anocracies: 2, open 
anocracies: 3, and democracies: 4. 
 
Figure 2. Aggregate GNI per Capita in Purchasing Power Parity, 1990-2014, by Polity classified 
regime type. Both anocratic regime types were significantly lower than autocracies or 
democracies (p<0.01). 
 
Water Resources and Regime Type 
 It was assessed whether water resources differed between regime types to ensure water 
resources were not an inhibiting factor to reduce water security, nor possibly causally 
contributing to the development of one regime type over another. Analysis partially support the 
assumption of no relationship, as a mere 5% of the variability in water resources could be 
explained by regime type, and only open anocracies significantly deferred from the rest, having 
more abundant natural internal water resources than autocracies in a cross sectional analysis of 
water resources in the year 2014. 
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Water Security & Natural Freshwater Resources 
 An additional control analysis was conducted to assess whether natural freshwater 
resources has any effect on water security. No direct relationship was found (Table 1), as 
p=.5673, far above a .05 alpha level. 
Table 1. Effect of National Internal Freshwater Resources on National Water Security 
 
 
Water Security and Conflict 
 Prior studies indicate the disruptive nature of conflict on delivery systems and 
infrastructure, thus a control analysis was conducted to see if conflict affects water security. 
Regression analysis supports prior studies, demonstrating that increasing magnitude of MEPV 
produces a negative consequence on national water security, supporting water-conflict literature  
Regime Type and Water Security 
 The major question of the paper is whether regime type indeed affects water security. 
Preliminary analysis was conducted to test, prior imposing predictor or interacting variables, if 
regime type affects water security in a simple OLS regression. Results support that regime type 
does affect water security, using the measure access to improved water source (Figure 3), as the 
p-value<0.000. Given all the factors likely affecting water security, that regime type itself 
explains over 13% of the variance in water security reveals a robust explanatory relationship. 
These results support alternative hypotheses H1 and H2. 
                                                                                
         _cons     83.49397   .6540301   127.66   0.000     82.21041    84.77753
waterresources    -9.25e-06   .0000162    -0.57   0.567     -.000041    .0000225
                                                                                
 watersecurity        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
       Total    307980.573   925   332.95197           Root MSE      =  18.254
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0007
    Residual    307871.462   924  333.194223           R-squared     =  0.0004
       Model    109.110849     1  109.110849           Prob > F      =  0.5673
                                                       F(  1,   924) =    0.33
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     926
  23 
 
Figure 3. Effect of Regime Type on Water security. 
 
Bureaucratic Capacity & Regime Type 
 As postulated, anocracies were significantly less water secure than autocratic or 
democratic regimes. Without accounting for higher order relationships, anocracies were 
characterized by low administrative capacities, despite their intermediate civilian liberties. 
 
Figure 4. Relationship between Bureaucratic Capacity and Regime Type.  
 
The above preliminary findings supported the proposed bureaucratic capacity theory of water 
security and that further analyses to deconstruct the relationships was founded. 
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Modeling Governance, Regime Types, and Water Security 
 With preliminary analyses supporting delving into the interacting causal variables affect 
national water security, multiple variable regression analyses with various predictor variable 
interactions were conducted to assess conditional, interaction, and marginal effects on water 
security. Analyses were conducted in a time series manner, thereby controlling for the effect of 
passage of time and ensuring accuracy in directional relationships.  
Analyses revealed that GNI/capita, time, and regime type each significantly affect water 
security (Figure 3). Specifically, compared to autocracies, closed anocracies produce 
significantly reduced access to improved water sources (-4.2%, p=0.017), while a significantly 
larger percentage of the population of democracies has access to an improved water source 
(10.697%, p=0.000), compared to autocracies, even when controlling for time and the three 
control variables (MEPV, endemic freshwater resources, GNI/capita PPP). Interestingly, 
regardless of the other variables, the passage of time has a positive effect on water security, with 
each additional year that passes correlating with an increase of .129% of the population being 
water secure (p=0.045). Gross national income had a strong effect on water security, as expected 
(p<.01). Given the large numbers dealt with in GNI/capita, the correlation coefficient appears 
zero (0.0004884), only because a 1 international dollar increase has such a small, but still 
significant effect on water security. Interestingly, the presence of conflict (MEPV) and existing 
water resources did not significantly affect water security, when controlling for the other 
variables (p=0.070 and p=0.653, respectively). Regime type and the three control variables 
assessed have a strong interacting effect on water security, explaining 41% of the variability in 
national annual water security. Assessment of marginal effects of each conditioning variable on 
water security, with regime types compared to autocracies, a far more powerful marginal effect 
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of regime type (in terms of level of democratization) on water security than can be accounted for 
by natural water resources, degree of development (measured in GNI/capita PPP), or the 
presence and magnitude of any conflict (Figure 3). 
Table 2. Multiple Variable Times-Series Regression Analysis of Factors Affecting Water 
Security, 1990-2014 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. How do Various National Characteristics Affect Water Security? 
As no direct relationship was found between natural water resources and water security, 
an interaction analysis was conducted to see if the effect of natural water resources was 
conditional on the regime. No interaction was found, thus suggesting, against intuition, that 
natural water resources have no significant effect (p>.55 for all regime type interactions) on 
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water security (Table 3). An interaction between regime type and MEPV also did not 
significantly affect water security (p>.160 for all regime types). 
Table 3. Natural Water Resources and Regime Interaction Model on Water Security 
 
 
 
A final interaction model, including interaction effects between regime and development 
(GNI/cap) was employed. This model was most robust, explaining 46.7% of the variance in 
water security. In anocracies improvements in GNI/capita conditions their negative effect on 
water security relative to autocracies.  
 
Table 4. Development*Regime Interaction Effects on Water Security 
 
 
                                                                     
                        N                                  137      
                        R2                                0.42      
                                                        (15.97)**   
                        _cons                            80.891     
                        o.waterresources                  0.000     
                                                         (0.76)     
                        mepv                             -0.636     
                                                        (5.98)**    
                        gnicap                            0.000     
                                                         (0.09)     
                        4.regime#c.waterresources         0.000     
                                                         (0.20)     
                        3.regime#c.waterresources         0.000     
                                                         (0.18)     
                        2.regime#c.waterresources        -0.000     
                        1b.regime#co.waterresources       0.000     
                                                         (0.20)     
                        waterresources                   -0.000     
                                                         (1.08)     
                        4.regime                          5.294     
                                                         (0.08)     
                        3.regime                         -0.442     
                                                         (1.63)     
                        2.regime                         -9.166     
                        1b.regime                         0.000     
                                                                     
                                                      watersecurity 
                                                                     
                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                 
                            N                         3,576     
                            R2                        0.47      
                                                     (1.08)     
                            _cons                    -72.136    
                            o.gnicap                  0.000     
                                                    (3.96)**    
                            mepv                     -0.611     
                                                     (2.15)*    
                            year                      0.072     
                                                    (4.92)**    
                            4.regime#c.gnicap         0.000     
                                                    (16.12)**   
                            3.regime#c.gnicap         0.002     
                                                    (6.13)**    
                            2.regime#c.gnicap         0.000     
                            1b.regime#co.gnicap       0.000     
                                                    (16.88)**   
                            gnicap                    0.000     
                                                    (13.24)**   
                            4.regime                 10.561     
                                                    (8.94)**    
                            3.regime                 -9.775     
                                                    (6.06)**    
                            2.regime                 -5.474     
                            1b.regime                 0.000     
                                                                 
                                                  watersecurity 
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 Adding bureaucratic capacity as a control variable produced two interesting findings. 
First, both anocratic regime types reduced water security over time, compared to democracies 
and autocracies, even while maintaining the three control variables and state capacity (open, 
p<0.013; closed, p<0.0001, see Figure 4). Closed anocracies produced reduced water security 
compared to open anocracies (p<0.065). In this model, bureaucratic capacity had a significantly 
positive marginal effect on water security (p<0.0001). 
 
Figure 4. Marginal Effects of Regime Type on Water Security Compared to Autocracies over 
Time. In this figure, regime types in numerical order are closed anocracy, open anocracies, and 
democracies. The three control variables and bureaucratic capacity, coded, “government 
effectiveness” were included in the model. 
 
 An interaction between bureaucratic capacity and regime type was added to the model. In 
support of hypothesis H7 bureaucratic capacity (BC) produced a positive marginal interaction 
effect on both anocracy categories compared to autocratic and democratic regimes, even with BC 
and regime independently included (open, p<0.000; closed, p<0.040, see Figure. 4). In this 
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model, development, passage of time, and bureaucratic capacity maintained their own significant 
marginal effects (p<0.020, p<0.003, p,0.039, respectively), while closed anocracies still 
produced lower water security outcomes compared to autocracies (t=-2.13); no other regime 
affected water security. This model explained 52.07% of water security variability. See Appendix 
A for data output. 
 
Discussion 
The study advanced water security and bureaucratic capacity literature by bridging the 
gap and providing an alternative theory to the traditional civilian liberties theory of water 
security. By controlling for key variables across many nations, the study laid the groundwork for 
further exploration into the bureaucratic theory of water security. 
Improving water security globally is an essential human endeavor, as water rights are a 
central human right, and a necessity in the realization of many other human rights. However, this 
study has several key limitations. First, it only assesses the period from 1990 to 2014, and once 
bureaucratic capacity variable is included, from 1996-2014, thereby limiting the generalizability 
over time to differences in regimes. Secondly, each predictor variable assessed only partially 
addresses the core concept attempting to be measured. Future analyses would be wise to account 
for multiple development indicators, as well as further natural resource variables, such as climate 
and topography (as both could affect water resources as well as creation of water related 
infrastructure). The renewable freshwater resource variable was limited in time series analyses as 
the measure was only assessed every two to every four years in each country, as such, an annual 
and equally comprehensive measure may better reveal relationships. World region was further 
not accounted for in this analysis, to determine whether world region, such as countries in Africa, 
condition the effect of regime type on water security, this could inform regional differences 
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interacting with regime characteristics (civilian liberties and bureaucratic capacity). Given the 
agglomeration of several datasets, data was missing from a significant number of states, thereby 
limiting analyses to only 165 countries. That gap in data must be filled to reach more conclusive 
findings. The government effectiveness proxy for bureaucratic capacity may be insufficient for 
future studies. Lastly, the dependent measure, water security, only assessed a small part of the 
unifying concept. While percentage access to an improved water source reveals distribution and 
accessibility of water, overall water infrastructure was not assessed, these additional aspects may 
be added without adding imposing best-practice assumptions on means of achieving water 
security. Future studies should distillate each factor tested and add others (sectoral distribution in 
water usage, degree of climate change regional impact, etc.) and further explore the specific 
causal mechanisms underlying bureaucratic capacity influence on water security. 
 
Conclusion 
 Results of the study reveal several interesting trends and support all five alternative 
hypotheses. The data support several well-researched findings. The study reaffirms Democratic 
Peace Theory, with democracies being involved in significantly fewer and of lower magnitude 
major episodes of political violence. However, it challenges the civilian liberties theory of water 
security, and finds rather that not only did bureaucratic capabilities independently effect water 
availability, results indicate it may have a greater influence than civil liberties in affecting water 
security. Secondly, results support the theory that hybrid regimes are worse-off than either 
democracies or autocracies. This was evidenced by lower GNI per capita and more MEPVs. 
Anocratic water insecurity could not be explained by either. These findings support the 
underlying theory guiding the posited hypotheses. All was not lost for mixed-type regimes; 
improvements in administrative abilities mitigated otherwise negative relationship between 
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anocracies and water security. Water related natural disasters, droughts, and inequitable 
distribution may be most improved via domestic and outside support for state capacity building. 
As expected, conflict (MEPV) had a significant detrimental effect and development (GNI/capita 
PPP) had a positive effect on the water security measure employed, thus partially supporting 
conflict and economic development theories of water security. Contrary to expectations, 
naturally present water resources had no impact on state water security.  
 Several models, employing various controls and interaction effects, revealed that above 
and beyond the effect of conflict, development, and natural freshwater resources, governance 
significantly impacted water security, both in cross sectional analysis of the year 2014, and over 
the course of 1990-2014. What is more, the final model tested explained over 52% water security 
variance.  
It was hypothesized (H1) that democratic nations would be the most water secure regime 
type. The results of this study support this alternative hypothesis. Indeed, a far greater percentage 
of people in democracies have access to an improved water source. That this phenomenon exists, 
even when controlling for naturally present water resources, conflict, and a development index 
suggest, as theorized, that intrinsic differences exist between different regimes, and these 
differences significantly impact population health and human rights, as indicated by water 
security. The broad audience costs faced by political leaders in democracies, as well as regular, 
open elections, likely imposes incentives to provide adequate social services to the citizenry. 
Furthermore, democratic nations, as scored in the Polity database, have relatively free media, 
further increasing transparency and accountability, both domestically and internationally. These 
findings provide support that additional research should be conducted to reveal the causal 
mechanisms by which regime type affects water security. However, democracies did not fair 
  31 
significantly better than its authoritarian counterparts. Intriguingly, closed anocracies throughout 
every model most negatively impacted water security over time, even when controlling for 
conflict and development, support Bäck and Hadenius’ theory of governance and regime type 
(2008). Bureaucratic capacity improvements produced the most dramatically positive effect on 
water security in open anocracies. While this could be simply a floor effect, it reveals 
possibilities in how to differential focus development aid to developing anocratic nations. 
Additional research would need to be conducted to assess whether differences in provision of 
social human rights (such as access to water) varies between the two anocratic regime types, and 
what causal mechanisms produce that difference. 
 Compared to autocracies, all three regimes types have a significant positive conditional 
interaction with gross national income per capita, whereby increasing development (GNI/capita) 
has a conditionally greater positive effect on water security on other countries than autocracies. 
Regardless increased conflict in hybrid regimes, as countries shift from autocratic, totalitarian 
governments to more representative democracies, accountability extends to a greater number of 
people and there are greater audience costs in diverting public funds toward private needs. It may 
be that the more open governments serve as a means of curbing corruption and ensuring public 
money as well as developmental aid, is directed towards expanding access to water as well as 
other social services. 
  Climate change experts project increased water stress and reduced water security, 
globally, in the coming years. This process has even already begun in many regions around the 
world, particularly India. It is vital that policymakers and development agencies understand the 
best means of addressing and mitigating water insecurity. As such, different regime compositions 
may require employment of unique aid and development tools. For example, reducing water 
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insecurity in autocratic nations may not be best served by direct monetary aid, given the results 
of the study. Furthermore, as hybrid regimes are found to be the least water secure nations, 
peacekeepers, NGOs, and UN aid agencies may be address potential threats to water security by 
preemptively arriving and providing water-related aid in nations undergoing state transition, and 
shortly thereafter. Water’s essentiality to all human endeavors: industrial, agricultural, ecosystem 
maintenance, social, underscores the need to assess every factor affecting water security and 
human livelihood. This study finds that bureaucratic capacity has both an interactive effect with 
regime type on water security, and its own, independent positive influence. The mechanisms 
producing water security must be investigated further to provide policymakers with a best-means 
framework of addressing water issues at a state level. 
 This study’s findings may have profound implications on the measures taken to address 
water issues both for international institutions, such as WHO, and nations. Finding that 
improvements in GNI and bureaucratic capacity have positive effects on water security could 
shift policy choices and measures taken to improve citizen access to clean water. Developmental 
aid may be beneficially directed toward government capacity building over time, as its centrality 
in producing higher water security outcomes over term has been found. State administrative 
institutions mediate how conflicts over water are handled. They provide frameworks for 
competing interests to peacefully resolve disputes and establish water sharing. They guide 
sustainable investments in conservation and water storage. Inadequate or absent institutions can 
contribute to poor planning and insufficient water supplies, potentially exacerbating social and 
political tensions. Poor governance or political will lead to inadequate resources directed toward 
maintaining and developing a clean, sustainable water supply. Capacity constrains may 
inherently undermine effective implementation and equitable targeting of services at both 
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national and local levels of governance, and may be greatest by countries characterized by 
incongruent autocratic and democratic institutions. Strong institutions provide means of 
establishing national water policy coherence, while private companies and civil society 
organizations may lack the authority, legitimacy, incentives, and ability to balance competing 
water demands. With a multiplicity of threats to water security (climate change, pollution, 
industry, unsustainable agricultural practices, national water resources, etc.), only the 
governments with high institutional capacities may balance these at times competing demands to 
ensure civilian access to potable water.  
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